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The violation of certain Bell inequalities allows for device-independent information processing
secure against non-signalling eavesdroppers. However, this only holds for the Bell network, in which
two or more agents perform local measurements on a single shared source of entanglement. To
overcome the practical constraint that entangled systems can only be transmitted over relatively
short distances, large-scale multi-source networks have been employed. Do there exist analogues
of Bell inequalities for such networks, whose violation is a resource for device-independence? In
this paper, the violation of recently derived polynomial Bell inequalities will be shown to allow for
device-independence on multi-source networks, secure against non-signalling eavesdroppers.
The violation of Bell inequalities has been shown to
have immense practical importance for quantum infor-
mation processing [1–3]. Indeed, violation of certain
Bell inequalities is a resource for unconditionally se-
cure key distribution [1–7] and randomness amplification
[8–10], and for achieving certain computational advan-
tages [11–14][61]. Moreover, these protocols are device-
independent, meaning they depend only on the observed
output statistics of devices used to implement them. In
the case of key distribution, for certain protocols the vi-
olation of a Bell inequality can be used to lower bound
the secure key rate [3]. Furthermore, monogamy rela-
tions have been derived between the violation of certain
Bell inequalities and the amount information an eaves-
dropper can obtain about the generated key; the higher
the violation, the lower the information [15–17].
However, these results only hold for the Bell network
depicted in Fig. 1(a), in which two agents perform local
measurements on a single shared source of entangled sys-
tems. The utility of these networks is limited by practical
constraints: entangled systems can only be transmitted
over relatively short distances, and only a small number
of agents can share an entangled state distributed by a
single source [18–20]. To overcome this, large-scale multi-
source quantum networks, such as that schematically il-
lustrated in Fig. 2, have been employed [18, 19, 21–29].
Yet having multiple intermediate nodes in the network
opens the door for novel eavesdropping attacks not seen
in the Bell network. Do there exist analogues of Bell
inequalities for such multi-source networks whose viola-
tion is a resource for device-independence and which can
prevent novel eavesdropper attacks?
Recently, polynomial Bell inequalities have been de-
rived [30–38] on the correlations classically achievable in
multi-source networks. Violation of these polynomial in-
equalities witnesses non-classical behaviour in such net-
works. Can such violations be connected to advantages
in information processing on large quantum networks, as
was the case in the Bell network? The main obstacle to
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establishing such a connection is that the set of classi-
cal correlations of a given general network forms a non-
convex semi-algebraic set [33], thus methods establish-
ing standard Bell inequality violation as an information-
theoretic resource are no longer applicable [62].
Such bounds on the correlations generated in multi-
source networks were originally studied in the field of
Causal Inference [39, 40]. Recently, the tools and for-
malism pioneered in this field have begun to see applica-
tions in quantum information [41–46]. Indeed, this for-
malism subsumes and generalises standard cryptographic
constraints such as no-signalling and the assumption that
agents each have a secure laboratory, as is discussed in
more detail in Appendix A. In this formalism, agents
and sources are represented by nodes in directed acyclic
graphs (DAGs), with the arrows denoting the causal re-
lationship between nodes. For example, the DAG in
Fig 1(a) corresponds to the causal structure of the Bell
network. As in standard device-independence, this work
assumes that both measurement devices used by agents,
and the sources they measure, are supplied by an un-
trusted adversary, or eavesdropper [63].
In the Bell network, violation of a Bell inequality
rules out quantum [4] and post-quantum [3, 5] eaves-
droppers. In these attacks, the systems measured by the
agents could be correlated with a system held by the
eavesdropper, as depicted in Fig. 1(b). These need not
be quantum systems, as long as the DAG of Fig. 1(b)
holds. Measuring this system using a device with input
Z and outcome E, an eavesdropper could gain informa-
tion about agents’ outcomes. That is, it may be that
P (E|A,B,Z) 6= P (E|Z). By violating the chained Bell
inequality however [15, 17], agents can limit the informa-
tion such an eavesdropper can gain about their outcomes.
However, for the general networks considered here,
there are new avenues for eavesdropping attacks. The
eavesdropper supplying of the sources can hold systems
correlated with more than a single source, as in Fig. 2(c).
Additionally, the eavesdropper could even introduce cor-
relations [64] between sources, as in Fig. 2(d). The main
findings of the current work are:
1. For an eavesdropper holding independent post-
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2quantum systems that can each be correlated with
a single source, the violation of certain polynomial
inequalities bounds this eavesdropper’s information
about agents’ outcomes.
2. By introducing correlations between sources as-
sumed by the agents to be independent, an eaves-
dropper can simulate quantum correlations consis-
tent with the original DAG, hence gaining complete
knowledge of agents’ outcomes. However, increas-
ing the measurement settings can combat this.
3. A new intermediate device-independence scenario:
trusting a subset of sources are not correlated with
a single system held by an eavesdropper. Given this
assumption, the attack of item 2 can be prevented.
It should be emphasized here that, as in the work
of Ref. [5], security will be established against non-
signalling eavesdroppers by bounding their predictive
power to learn outcome of agents’ devices. In the case
of the Fig. 1(b), letting D (P,Q) := 12
∑
x |P (x) −Q(x)|
denote the total variational distance, this corresponds
to bounding D(P (E|A,X,Z), P (E|Z)). Another way of
bounding this is through the device-independent guessing
probability (see e.g. [47]). That is, through establishing
a bound on P (E = A). Informally, the difference be-
tween these two approaches is that, in the former, one
is bounding the amount of information an eavesdropper
can infer about agents’ outcomes from the result of their
chosen measurement, and, in the latter, one is bounding
the probability that the eavesdropper correctly guesses
agents’ outcomes.
Each of the above three points will now be illustrated
with concrete examples involving repeater and star net-
works. The derivations of all results in the remainder of
the paper are presented in the Appendix.
Repeater networks. Consider a repeater network in
which n sources are each shared between two out of n+1
agents, who each perform local measurements with their
devices. The crucial information about agents’ inputs
and outputs is captured by the DAG of Fig. 2(a). The
devices held by agents A1 and An+1 have two inputs,
denoted x1 and xn+1, with x1, xn+1 ∈ {0, 1}, and two
possible outputs A1 = a1 and An+1 = an+1, again with
a1, an+1 ∈ {0, 1}. All remaining agents have devices
with a single input and four possible outputs, denoted
Ai = a
0
i a
1
i with a
j
i ∈ {0, 1}. If all λi from Fig. 2(a) are
classical random variables, then an inequality bounding
the classically achievable correlations is:
R :=
√
I +
√
J ≤ 1, (1)
where I = 14
∑
x1,xn+1
〈A1A02 · · ·A0nAn+1〉,
J =
1
4
∑
x1,xn+1
(−1)x1+xn+1〈A1A12 · · ·A1nAn+1〉,
and 〈A1Ax22 · · ·An+1〉 =
∑
(−1)a1+an+1+
∑n
i=2 a
xi
i
P (a1, a
0
2a
1
2, . . . , an+1|x1, xn+1),
(2)
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FIG. 1: (a) Bell network: X,Y and A,B denote inputs and
outcomes of the agents. (b) Bell network with eavesdropper.
where the above sum ranges over a1, an+1, . . . , a
0
na
1
n. In-
equality (1) was derived in [34, 35, 38], and is the ana-
logue of a Bell inequality for this particular DAG. Note
that is non-linear in the joint conditional probability
distribution—hence the name polynomial Bell inequality.
Now, if all sources are claimed by the eavesdropper to
emit singlet states |ψ−〉, devices held by agents A1 and
An+1 to be carrying out measurements (σz + σx) /
√
2 for
x1 = 0 = xn+1 and (σz − σx) /
√
2 for x1 = 1 = xn+1 and
all remaining devices to be carrying out Bell state mea-
surements (BSMs), the generated correlations are [38]:
1 + (−1)a1+an+1
(
(−1)
∑n
i=2 a
0
i+(−1)
∑n
i=2 a
1
i+x1+xn+1
)
2
22n
.
(3)
Plugging this into Eq. (2) yields I = J = 1/2 [38], which
results in R = √2 > 1, a violation of Eq. (1).
Suppose, as depicted in Fig. 2(b), the eavesdropper
holds n independent systems each correlated with one of
the n sources. Furthermore, we allow the systems held
by the eavesdropper to be post-quantum (that is, non-
signalling), as long as the form of the DAG from Fig 2(b)
is enforced. Each system can be measured by a device
with input zi and output Ei. As the purpose of repeater
networks is to allow agents 1 and n+ 1 to communicate,
can such an eavesdropper learn the outputs of agents A1
and An+1?
Result 1. A violation of inequality (1) constitutes a
bound on an eavesdropper’s information about agents’
outcomes in for the network of Fig 2(b): let D (P,Q) :=
1
2
∑
x |P (x)−Q(x)| denote the total variational distance,
this bound on the information corresponds to
D
(
P (E1 · · ·En|A1, An+1x1, xn+1, z1, . . . , zn),
P (E1|z1) · · ·P (En|zn)
)
≤ 2 (2−R) .
(4)
While the above bound is quite weak [65], it formally
relates polynomial inequality violation to the amount of
information an eavesdropper can possess about agents’
outcomes. See Appendix B for a proof. It will be shown
in the star network section that increasing the number of
measurement settings increases the amount of violation,
hence the more measurement settings one has, the more
stringent the bound on the eavesdropper’s information.
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FIG. 2: (a) Repeater network: xi and Ai denote the possible
inputs and outcomes of agent i. (b) Repeater network with
eavesdropper holding a system correlated with each source:
zi and Ei denote the possible inputs and outcomes of the
measurement on each eavesdropper’s system. (c) Eavesdrop-
per holding system correlated with all but last source. (d)
Eavesdropper correlating first and last sources.
Result 2. By correlating only the i = 1 and n sources,
an eavesdropper can simulate the correlations of Eq. (3).
By introducing such correlations, an eavesdropper can
learn agents’ outcomes without alerting them [66]. More-
over, the sources only need to be classical. Such a model
is provided in Appendix C and shown to correspond ex-
actly to the quantum correlations Eq. (3). As the eaves-
dropper manufactured the devices and holds a copy of
each source, they can infer each agent’s output.
There are two ways to combat this: i) having
agents perform measurements that maximally violate the
Clauser-Horne-Shimony-Holt (CHSH) inequality ensures
their outputs are uncorrelated from an eavesdropper;
ii) take as a security assumption that the eavesdrop-
per does not hold a system correlated with both first
and last sources, as depicted in Fig. 2(d). Even by
holding a system correlated with all sources excluding
the last one (or the first one), an eavesdropper cannot
simulate the correlations of Eq. (3). Indeed, a variant
of Eq. (4), in which the left hand side is replaced by
D
(
P (E1, E2|A1, . . . , z2), P (E1|z1)P (E2|z2)
)
, with E and
E1 as depicted in Fig. 2(c), easily follows from the proof
of Eq. (4) in Appendix B.
Given the above, one might wonder why violating the
CHSH inequality is not always advocated over violating
inequality (1). If the sources are replaced with ‘noisy’
Bell states ρi = vi|φ−〉〈φ−|+ (1 − vi)I/4, the above two
cases provide an interesting trade-off between source vis-
ibility vi and security. Indeed, post-selecting interme-
diate BSMs results in another noisy Bell state shared
between agents A1 and An+1, but with lower visibility
V =
∏n
i=1 vi. The CHSH inequality can only be violated
by this induced noisy Bell state if V > 1/
√
2. For visibil-
ities below this threshold no security can be established.
Eq. (1) however can be violated for visibilities V > 1/2
[34, 38]. Hence, noisy sources that do not ensure secu-
rity in the Bell network can in principle establish some
security in repeater networks.
Star networks. Consider the star network depicted
in Fig. 3(a), first studied in [34, 35, 37], consisting of
n independent sources, each shared between a central
agent, B, and one of n external agents, Ai. The devices
held by each agent have k possible inputs, denoted y for
the central agent and xi for the external agents, and two
potential outputs, denoted b and ai.
Result 3. The following inequality bounds the classically
achievable correlations in Fig. 3(a):
S :=
k−1∑
i=0
|Ii|1/n ≤ k − 1, (5)
where, Ii =
1
2n
∑i+1
x1,...,xn=i
〈A1x1 · · ·AnxnBi〉, for i ranging
from 0 to k − 1, with Aik = −Ai0 and 〈A1x1 · · ·AnxnBy〉 =∑
(−1)b+
∑n
i=2 aiP (a1, . . . , anb|x1, . . . , xn, y).
See Appendix D for a proof.
All sources are claimed to be in the singlet state |ψ−〉.
The supplied devices are claimed to function by pro-
jecting onto the basis {cos rpi2k |0〉+ sin rpi2k |1〉,− sin rpi2k |0〉+
cos rpi2k |1〉}, where r is an integer equal to xi for the ith
external agent and y for central agent, outputting 0 for
the first basis element and 1 for the second. Here, the
central agent performs a separable measurement consist-
ing of simultaneously performing the same basis mea-
surement on each of their joint systems, outputting the
parity of individual outcomes. This implies that the op-
erator corresponding to the the central agent’s measure-
ment factorises [67] as By = B
1
y ⊗ · · · ⊗ Bny resulting in
〈Ax1 · · ·AxnBy〉 = 〈A1xB1y〉 · · · 〈AnxBny 〉. Inequality (5) is
upper bounded by k cos pi2k [48]. This upper bound is
achieved by the above measurements [49][68].
In what follows the simplifying assumption that the
central agents measurement device implements a separa-
ble measurement will be made. Note that, using the same
approach as Section III A 3 of [37], it can been shown that
all possible violations of Eq. (5) can be achieved using
separable measurements on the center node. Hence our
assumption of separable measurements is not unjustified.
Suppose, as depicted in Fig. 3(b), the eavesdropper
holds n independent (possibly post-quantum) systems,
each correlated with a single source. By using devices
with inputs zi and outputs Ei to measure these systems,
can an eavesdropper learn the outputs of agents Ai?
Result 4. Violating inequality (5) bounds an eavesdrop-
per’s information:
D
(
P (E1 · · ·En|A1, . . . , An, x1, . . . , xn, z1, . . . , zn),
P (E1|z1) · · ·P (En|zn)
)
≤ n (k − S) ≈
k→∞
O
(
1
k
) (6)
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FIG. 3: (a) Star network: y & B denote input and output of central agent and xi & Ai denote the inputs and outcomes of each
remaining agent. (b) Star network with eavesdropper holding system correlated with each source: zi and Ei denote possible
inputs and outputs of eavesdroppers’ measurements. (c) Eavesdropper holding system correlated with multiple sources.
Hence, as the number of measurement settings grows,
the eavesdropper becomes increasingly uncorrelated from
each agents outcome, see Appendix E.
In the repeater network section, an eavesdropper was
able to learn agents’ outcomes by introducing a bit α
which correlated the first and last sources, depicted in
Fig. 2(d). Could a similar eavesdropping attack work
here? In fact, the same level of security as Eq. (8) can
be established against an eavesdropper who correlates
m ≤ n sources by sharing a random variable with q < k
values—each taken with probability pl—among the m
sources, as illustrated in Fig. 3(c). This is formalised
by demanding that an eavesdropper’s information about
agents’ outcomes takes the following form:
PE|A1···Am =
q∑
l=1
plPEl1|A1 · · ·PElm|Am . (7)
Result 5. Given Eq. (7), the following bound can be
derived:
D
(
P (EEn−m · · ·En|A1, x1, . . . , z, zn−m . . . , zn),
P (E|z) · · ·P (En|zn)
)
≤ (n+m(q − 1)) (k − S) . (8)
This goes as 1/k for large k, see Appendix F. If
an eavesdropper introduces correlations between sources,
their information of agents’ outcomes can be bounded as
long as the measurement settings are sufficiently large.
Conclusion. Monogamy relations using the degree
of violation of a Bell inequality to bound an eaves-
dropper’s information are central to standard device-
independent information processing [8, 15, 16, 50]. Thus,
the results presented in this work pave the way for
device-independent information processing on multi-
source quantum networks. Indeed, Eq. (3) states that
once intermediate outcomes are announced, agents A1
and An+1 share a bit. Moreover, an eavesdropper’s in-
formation about this bit is bounded by the degree of vi-
olation of polynomial Bell inequality (1). Hence device-
independent key distribution is possible in repeater net-
works. Moreover, security can be established using en-
tangled sources with lower visibilities than that required
for key distribution in the Bell network. Future work
will focus on establishing a full security proof for device-
independent key distribution on repeater networks.
However, for multi-source quantum networks, there are
new avenues for eavesdropping attacks; by correlating
sources an eavesdropper can simulate quantum correla-
tions consistent with the original DAG. Fortunately, it
was demonstrated that increasing the number of mea-
surement settings, or ensuring the eavesdropper does
not hold a system correlated with a specified subset of
sources, can prevent this attack. As large-scale quantum
networks—a primer for a quantum internet—are becom-
ing possible with current technology, developing novel in-
formation processing protocols on such networks is criti-
cal. Moreover, as component networks making up future
large quantum networks are likely to consist of diverse
technologies, having protocols that are independent of
specific technological implementations is critical.
Beyond generalised monogamy relations, can violation
of polynomial Bell inequalities be related to advantages
in other information processing tasks? Ref.’s [11–13]
have related non-local correlations in the Bell network
to quantum advantages over classical computers. This
was established in the measurement-based paradigm—
where adaptive measurements are performed on a single
source. Relating computational advantages to violation
of polynomial inequalities would be quite practical: it is
more feasible to create an entangled state consisting of
multiple sources of few-body entangled systems than of
a single source of many-body entangled systems.
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5Appendix A: Brief background on DAGs
The structure of each DAG encodes conditional in-
dependence relations [69] among the nodes. For in-
stance, the no-signalling conditions in the Bell network,
P (A|X,Y ) = P (A|X), and P (B|X,Y ) = P (B|Y ), can
be seen to directly follow [41] from the structure of
the DAG depicted in Fig. 1(a). Indeed, the specifica-
tion of the DAG subsumes and generalises the standard
no-signalling relations [44, 54, 55]. Indeed, in the case
of the general network from Fig. 2(a), the structure of
the DAG ensures P (Ai|xi, Aj) = P (Ai|xi) for all j /∈
{i− 1, i, i+ 1} and P (Ai|xi, xj) = P (Ai|xi) for all j 6= i.
Additionally, this structure ensures P (Ai|Aj) = P (Ai),
for j /∈ {i − 1, i, i + 1}. This is due to the fact that
non-neighbouring agents can only be correlated through
knowledge of neighbouring agents outcomes. Moreover,
the assumption that each agent has a secure laboratory
is enforced by the lack of an arrow from an eavesdropper
to each agent’s outcome. In short, every constraint gov-
erning how the inputs and outputs of agents and eaves-
droppers are related is specified by the DAG.
Appendix B: Proof of Result 1
Consider the following conditional distribution
P (A,B,E|X,Y, Z), where A,B are binary random
variables and X,Y are k-valued, satisfying the “no-
signalling” conditions:
P (A,B|X,Y, Z) = P (A,B|X,Y )
P (A,E|X,Y, Z) = P (A,E|X,Z)
P (B,E|X,Y, Z) = P (B,E|Y,Z).
(B1)
It was shown in Ref.’s [5, 15, 17, 56] that
D (P (E|A,X,Z), P (E|Z)) ≤ Ik (P (A,B|X,Y )) , (B2)
where Ik is the chained Bell inequality [49] on k measure-
ment settings, defined as:
Ik (P (A,B|X,Y )) := P (A = B|X = 1, B = k)
+
∑
|x−y|=1
P (A 6= B|X = x, Y = y) (B3)
Consider the left hand side of inequality (4), it will now
be shown to decompose as
D
(
P (E1 · · ·En|A1, An+1x1, xn+1, z1, . . . , zn),
P (E1|z1) · · ·P (En|zn)
)
≤ D (P (E1|A1, x1, z1), P (E1|z1))
+D (P (En|An, xn, zn), P (En|zn)) ,
(B4)
where again, the systems held by the eavesdropper could
be post-quantum (that is, non-signalling). Indeed, the
structure of the DAG from Fig. 2(b) implies the following
conditional independence relations:
P (E1 · · ·En|A1, An+1, x1, xn+1, z1, . . . , zn) =
P (E1|A1, z1)P (En|An+1, zn)
n−1∏
i=2
P (Ei|zi).
(B5)
Combining with the definition of D(·, ·) yields Eq. (B4).
The DAG of Fig. 2(b) ensures the no-signalling rela-
tions of Eq. (B1) hold between Ai, Ei, xi, zi. The con-
junction of this with Eq.’s (B2) and (B4) implies
D
(
P (E1 · · ·En|A1, An+1x1, xn+1, z1, . . . , zn),
P (E1|z1) · · ·P (En|zn)
)
≤ 2I2
(B6)
The chained Bell inequality will now be connected to in-
equality (1). First let us look at the specific case of the
measurements introduced in the repeater network sec-
tion. After considering this example, the general case
will be proved.
To this end, consider the following mapping:
P (a1, a
0
2a
1
2, . . . , an+1|x1, xn+1) −→
P (a1, a2, . . . , an, an+1|x1, x2, . . . , xn, xn+1)
=
∑
δa2,ax2 · · · δan,axnP (a1, a02a12, . . . |x1, xn+1),
(B7)
where the sum ranges over {a0i a1i }i. One can interpret
the above mapping as follows: agents i = 2 to i = n
use their devices to simulate a two choice xi ∈ {0, 1},
binary outcome measurement by outputting the bit axii
from the pair output by their device a0i a
1
i . It is clear that
as each agent makes their choice locally, no correlations
have been introduced between agents. Hence, both I, J
from Eq. (2) and N from Eq. (1) are invariant under
mapping (B7). For a more in-depth discussion on this
point, see section III B from [38].
Applying the above mapping to Eq. (3) from the main
text yields
1 + (−1)
∑n
i=2 ai
(
∏n
i=2 δxi,0+(−1)x1+xn+1
∏n
i=2 δxi,01)
2
2n+1
(B8)
Any repeater network in which agents 2 to n have binary
inputs and outputs that generates the above correlations
has the same value for N as the one considered in the
main text. Indeed, Eq. (B8) can be generated by agents 2
to n performing the separable measurements Ayi = A
y
i,0⊗
Ayi,1 ∈ {σz ⊗ σz, σx ⊗ σx}, for i = 2, . . . , n [38]. Here, an
agent measures both of their received systems in the same
basis and outputs the parity of the individual measure-
ment outcomes. Given these separable measurements
for intermediate nodes, one has 〈Ax11 A2 · · ·Axn+1n+1 〉 =
〈Ax21 Ax22,0〉〈Ax22,1Ax33,0〉 · · · 〈Axnn,1Axn+1n+1 〉. Moreover, it follows
6that 〈Axii,1Axi+1i+1,0〉 = 1. Combining all this, it follows that
I =
1
4
(〈A01A02,0〉+ 〈A11A02,0〉) (〈A0n+1A0n,1〉+ 〈A1n+1A0n,1〉)
J =
1
4
(〈A01A12,0〉 − 〈A11A12,0〉) (〈A0n+1A1n,1〉 − 〈A1n+1A1n,1〉) .
(B9)
As agents A1 and An+1 and A2,0 and An,1 respectively
choose from the same set of measurements, one has
R = 1
2
|〈A0B0〉+ 〈A1B0〉|
+
1
2
|〈A0B1〉 − 〈A1B1〉|,
(B10)
where 〈A0B0〉 := 〈A01A02,0〉 = 〈A0n+1A0n,1〉 formalises the
statement that A1, An+1 and A2,0, An,1 choose from the
same set of measurements, respectively.
The above is the k = 2 instance of the CHSH inequality
Ck =
k−1∑
i=0
〈AiBi〉+
k−2∑
i=0
〈Ai+1Bi〉 − 〈A0Bk−1〉. (B11)
Using 〈AB〉 = 2P (A = B)− 1, it follows that
Ik = k − 1
2
Ck. (B12)
Combing this with Eq. (B6), Eq. (4) follows.
For the general case, consider the following. As in
the above example, agents i = 2 to i = n use their de-
vices to simulate a two choice xi ∈ {0, 1}, binary out-
come measurement by outputting the bit axii from the
pair output by their device a0i a
1
i . This does not change
the value of the polynomial Bell inequality. Moreover, as
this amounts to a classical post-processing of intermedi-
ate agents outcomes, it also does not affect any potential
correlations between an eavesdropper and the first and
last agent in the network.
It was shown in Theorem 1 of Ref. [57] that coarse-
graining a two-qubit measurement with four outcomes in
the manner discussed above results in a separable mea-
surement. This is in fact always true, even for a two-
qudit measurement. Indeed, as the dimension is not given
a priori, without loss of generality one can always take
this measurement to consist of four rank-1 projectors by
appending ancillary systems. Coarse graining these as
above results in operators which satisfy the conditions of
Lemma 1 of [58], which states that these can be reduced
to a direct sum of 2-qubit operators, as is done in Eq. (9)
of [59] for instance. The problem has now been reduced
to the case of 2-qubit measurements which were covered
by [57], as discussed above.
Given intermediate separable measurements,
one again has that 〈Ax11 A2 · · ·Axn+1n+1 〉 =
〈Ax21 Ax22,0〉〈Ax22,1Ax33,0〉 · · · 〈Axnn,1Axn+1n+1 〉. Following the
reasoning of Eq. (B9), one can show the following holds
(see Eq. (13) of Ref. [60] for more details):
R ≤ 1
2
√
CA1A2,0k CAn,1An+1k
where CAiAjk is the CHSH inequality between agents i
and j. Hence, using the fact that the arithmetic mean is
larger than the geometric mean, one has
R ≤ C
A1A2,0
k
4
+
CAn,1An+1k
4
.
Using Eq. (B12), one obtains
2I2 = 4− C
A1A2,0
k
2
− C
An,1An+1
k
2
≤ 2 (2−R) .
Inputting into Eq. (B6), provides the desired result.
Appendix C: Proof of result 2: classically simulating
the quantum correlations of Eq. (3)
It will now be demonstrated that by correlating the
i = 1 and n sources, an eavesdropper can simulate the
correlations of Eq. (3). Moreover, the sources only need
to emit classical variables. To achieve this, the eavesdrop-
per sends independent and uniformly distributed bits
{α, λi} to agent Ai, for i = 1 and n + 1. Given these
bits and the agents’ input, the agent’s device outputs
ai = λi ⊕ αxi. The conditional probability distribution
characterising the action of the device is P (ai|α, λi, xi) =
1
2
(
1 + (−1)ai+λi+αxi) .
Agent Ai, for i = 2 and n, is sent independent, uni-
formly distributed bits {α, νi, λi−1, λi, λ˜i}, on receipt of
which their device outputs
Ai = (a
0
i , a
1
i ) =
{
(λi−1 ⊕ λi, νi), if α = 0,
(νi, λi−1 ⊕ λ˜i), if α = 1.
(C1)
Note that agents 1, 2, n− 1, and n receive a copy of the
bit α. Hence, source 1 and n are now correlated. Recall-
ing the transmitted bits are uniformly distributed, the
conditional probability distribution characterising this
device will now be derived:∑
ν
P
(
a0i a
1
i |α, ν, λi−1, λi, λ˜i
)
P (ν)
=
∑
ν
[
P (a0i |λi−1, λi)P (a1i |ν)P (ν)δα,0
+ P (a1i |λi−1, λ˜i)P (a0i |ν)P (ν)δα,1
]
=
1
4
(
1 + (−1)a0i+λi−1+λiδα,0 + (−1)a1i+λi−1+λ˜iδα,1
)
.
Finally, all remaining agents Ai = a
0
i a
1
i , i = 3, . . . , n−
1, are sent uniformly distributed bits {λi−1, λ˜i−1, λi, λ˜i}.
On receipt of which their devices output a0i = λi−1 ⊕ λi
and a1i = λ˜i−1 ⊕ λ˜i. The conditional probability distri-
bution is 14
(
1 + (−1)a0i+λi−1+λi
)(
1 + (−1)a1i+λ˜i−1+λ˜i
)
.
Combining all of these conditional probability distribu-
tions yields the following:
7P (a1, a
0
2a
1
2, . . . , a
0
na
1
n, an+1|x1, xn+1) =∑
α,ν,λ1,...,λn
P (a1|α, λ1)P (a02a12|α, ν, λ1, λ2, λ˜2)P (a03a13|λi−1, λ˜i−1, λi, λ˜i) · · ·P (a1|α, λ1)P (α)P (ν)P (λ1) · · ·P (λn)
=
1
22n
∑
α,λ1,...,λn
(
1 + (−1)ai+λi+αxi) (1 + (−1)a0i+λi−1+λiδα,0 + (−1)a1i+λi−1+λ˜iδα,1) · · ·P (λn)P (α)
=
1
22n
(
1 + (−1)a1+an+1
∑
α
(
(−1)
∑n
i=2 a
0
i δα,0P (α) + (−1)
∑n
i=2 a
1
i+x1+xn+1δα,1P (α)
))
.
Performing the sum over α and recalling that P (α = 0) =
1/2 = P (α = 1), results in the quantum distribution of
Eq. (3). Hence the eavesdropper can perfectly simulate
quantum correlations by correlating sources thought to
be independent. The last line of the above equation fol-
lows by noting that, as one multiplies out each condi-
tional distribution, terms of the form
∑
λ(−1)λ vanish.
Appendix D: Proof of Result 4
The proof will follow the strategy of [37, Proof of The-
orem 1] and [34, Proof of Eq. (20)]. Consider a classical
model for Fig. 3(a), where all the λi are random variables.
Writing
〈Aixi〉λi =
∑
ai
(−1)aiP (Ai = ai|xi, λi)
〈By〉λ =
∑
b
(−1)bP (B = b|y, λ),
(D1)
where λ is shorthand for λ1 · · ·λn, one has
Ii =
1
2n
i+1∑
x1,...,xn=i
∫ ( n∏
j=1
qj(λj)〈Ajxj 〉λj
)
〈Bi〉λdλj (D2)
for i = 0, . . . , k − 1, where qj(λj) is the distribution over
the λi’s. Taking the absolute value yields
|Ii| ≤
n∏
j=1
(1
2
∫
qj(λj)
∣∣∣ n∑
xj=1
〈Ajxj 〉λj
∣∣∣dλj), (D3)
as
∣∣∣〈Bi〉λ∣∣∣ ≤ 1.
It was shown in Ref. [37] that, for cki ∈ R+ and m,n ∈
N, the following holds:
m∑
k=1
( n∏
i=1
cki
)1/n
≤
i+1∏
i=1
(
c1i + c
2
i + · · ·+ xmi
)1/n
. (D4)
Applying this result to S = ∑k−1i=0 |Ii|1/n yields
S ≤
[ n∏
j=1
1
2
∫
qj(λj)
(∣∣∣〈Aj0〉λj + 〈Aj1〉λj ∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣〈Aj1〉λj
+ 〈Aj2〉λj
∣∣∣+ · · ·+ ∣∣∣〈Ajk−1〉λj − 〈Aj0〉λj ∣∣∣)dλj]1/n.
(D5)
The following upper bound holds:
1
2
(∣∣∣〈Aj0〉λj + 〈Aj1〉λj ∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣〈Aj1〉λj + 〈Aj2〉λj ∣∣∣+
· · ·+
∣∣∣〈Ajk−1〉λj − 〈Aj0〉λj ∣∣∣) ≤ k − 1. (D6)
Hence, one has
S ≤
( n∏
j=1
∫
qj(λj) (k − 1)n dλj
)1/n
= k − 1 (D7)
finishing the derivation of Eq. (5).
Appendix E: Proof of result 5
The structure of the DAG from Fig. 3(a) yields the
following conditional independence relation:
P (E1 · · ·En|A1, . . . An, x1, . . . xn+1, z1, . . . , zn) =
P (E1|A1, z1)P (E2|A2, z2) · · ·P (En|An, zn). (E1)
From this it follows that
D
(
P (E1 · · ·En|A1, . . . , An, x1, . . . , xn, z1, . . . , zn),
P (E1|z1) · · ·P (En|zn)
)
≤
∑
i
D (P (Ei|Ai, xi, zi), P (Ei|zi)) .
As stated in the main text, it is assumed that the central
agents device is implementing separable measurements,
hence one has By = B
1
y ⊗ · · · ⊗ Bny . Given this separa-
ble measurements, one can show that the following holds
(again, see Eq. (13) of Ref. [60] for more details)
S ≤ 1
2
(∏
i
CA
iBi
k
) 1
n
. (E2)
8Following the same analysis as the end of Appendix B,
the conjunction of Eq. (E2) with Eq. (B2) yields Eq. (6).
The upper bound of Eq. (E2) can in fact be reached
using the measurements introduced in the main paper.
As all external agents choose from the same set of mea-
surements, one has CA
iBi
k = C
AjBj
k ,∀i, j. This implies
the maximal quantum value of Inequality (5) is the max-
imal quantum value of CABk , which has been shown by
[48] to be k cos
(
pi
2k
)
.
Appendix F: Proof of result 6
Combing Eq. (E1) with the fact that pl from Eq. (7)
satisfies |pl| ≤ 1 ∀i, Eq. (8) follows.
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